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It has long been supposed that atheism and naturalism stand in the closest connection.​[1]​ Thus, John Herman Randall Jr, writing in 1944, tells us that ‘there is no room for any Supernatural in naturalism – no supernatural or transcendental God and no personal survival after death’, and that the position ‘finds itself in thoroughgoing opposition to all forms of thought which assert the existence of a supernatural or transcendental Realm of Being and make knowledge of that realm of fundamental importance to human living.​[2]​ More recently, and in similar anti-supernaturalist vein, we are told that ‘the most familiar definition is in terms of the rejection of supernatural entities such as gods, demons, souls, and ghosts,​[3]​ that ‘[n]aturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism’, supernaturalism involving ‘the invocation of an agent or force that somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and whose doings cannot be understood as part of it’,​[4]​ and that ‘[e]excluded by anti-supernaturalism are such things as immaterial minds or souls, vital forces, and divine beings’.​[5]​
	So the naturalist – or at least, the typical naturalist – is opposed to supernaturalism, and this involves a rejection of supernatural entities like gods, demons, souls, and ghosts. This leaves us with ‘the familiar natural world’ in which we live and move and have our being, and we are encouraged to suppose that the position is both eminently sensible and intellectually superior. As James Griffin has put it, it is an admirable and deep motive force behind naturalism that we do not need ‘any world except the ordinary world around us – mainly the world of humans and animals and happenings in their lives. An other-worldly realm [] just produces unnecessary problems about what it could possibly be and how we could learn about it’.​[6]​ The implication here is that the naturalist is simply removing from our ontology a superfluous and problematic something else – a supernatural realm of being which, for the unenlightened amongst us, is of fundamental importance both to reality in general and human living in particular. Small wonder that naturalism ‘has become a slogan in the name of which the vast majority of work in analytic philosophy is pursued’,​[7]​ featuring ‘what many believe to be the strongest and most promising achievements of twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy’.​[8]​ 
We have a sense of what the naturalist is seeking to avoid, and an equal sense that its underlying motive is to be applauded. After all, it is surely a good thing to be removing from our ontology realms and items that we do not need. What is less clear is how we are to determine what stands to be eliminated in this way. Ghosts, demons, and gods seem reasonable enough contenders, but what about vital forces and what about God? Are these things superfluous and problematic? And how can we legislate upon what counts as such without first having a clearly defined conception of the nature and limits of the supposedly familiar and unproblematic natural world? 
The naturalism in the name of which the vast majority of work in analytic philosophy is pursued has tended to be defined in exclusively scientific terms. Thus we are told by Randall that the naturalist’s creed presupposes ‘reliance on an unrestricted scientific method and the consequent rejection of any form of supernaturalism’,​[9]​ and the editors of a recent collection claim that the position involves ‘a commitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature’ (the ontological theme), and ‘a reconception of the traditional relation between philosophy and science according to which philosophical enquiry is conceived of as continuous with science’ (the methodological theme).​[10]​ 
	The question of the limits of science is no less problematic than that of the limits of nature, and it is understandable that there has been disagreement over what it could mean to commit to an exclusively scientific conception of nature and an unrestricted scientific method. According to one way of thinking, we should all be reductive materialists or materialist naturalists. As Thomas Nagel puts it, ‘among the scientists and philosophers who do express views about the natural order as a whole, reductive materialism is widely assumed to be the only serious possibility’. ​[11]​ Reductive materialism admits of various characterizations, ranging from David Armstrong’s ‘the natural world contains nothing but the entities recognised by physics’​[12]​ to John Dupré’s more recent ‘if there is only material stuff in the world (no spooky stuff), then the properties of stuff must ultimately explain everything’.​[13]​ Dupré challenges Nagel’s account of the position’s supposed prevalence, objecting that it expresses a once popular view which has been ‘almost entirely rejected by philosophers actually engaged with the physical and biological sciences: it simply has no interesting relation to the diversity of things that scientists actually do’.​[14]​ We are to suppose that the scientists themselves have moved beyond this paradigm, although Dupré claims elsewhere that its reductive spirit continues to animate philosophical thought,​[15]​ and a recent interview in Scientific American finds the physicist George Ellis bemoaning the fact that many of his fellow scientists remain ‘strong reductionists’.​[16]​
The strong reductionist takes the measure of nature to be physics. A more moderate naturalism defines this measure with reference to a broader conception of science (Why just physics? How on earth could that explain everything? And what reason could be given for insisting upon this restriction?); and an even more moderate position challenges the assumption that the offending restriction can be lifted only in terms which are themselves restricted by science (Why just science? How on earth could that explain everything? And what reason could be given for insisting upon this restriction?). It is in the context of giving expression to these anti-scientistic complaints that we find John McDowell recommending that we ‘discourag(e) this dazzlement by science’ which leads us to suppose that ‘genuine truth is restricted to what can be validated by their methods’.​[17]​ It should go without saying that this is not a rejection of science.    	
	The atheist and scientist Richard Dawkins has been suitably and familiarly dazzled. Thus, he insists that ‘God’s existence or non-existence is a scientific fact about the universe…the presence or absence of a creative super-intelligence is unequivocally a scientific question’,​[18]​ his professed aim being to ‘attack[] God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented’.​[19]​ For Dawkins then, the scientific fact about the universe is that God is absent from its domain, and he concludes on this basis that atheism must be embraced. His attitude would be embraced by those naturalists who insist that the limits of nature are to be circumscribed by science, and they express a similar antipathy towards ‘anything and everything supernatural’. As noted, however, the limits of science are themselves in question, and even supposing that we have a relatively clear grasp upon what counts as science and what does not, there is no justification for launching the kind of attack Dawkins has in mind. For if ‘supernatural’ is the logical complement of ‘natural’ in the scientific sense, then the astounding claim is that what comes under attack is anything which does not fall within the explanatory domain of science. 
	McDowell and Griffin reject scientistic naturalism, but they are happy to describe themselves as naturalists. After all, naturalism is motivated by the admirable thought that we do not need any world except the ordinary world around us, and that an other-worldly realm just produces unnecessary problems about what it could possibly be and how we could learn about it. It should be clear from what has been said that the distinction between what is intra- and other-worldly is ill-defined, and that the more liberal or expansive naturalist rejects the scientific naturalist’s conception of these notions. That is to say, he denies that the scientist has the monopoly on nature/world, and must deny therefore that an other-worldly realm comes into play whenever these scientistic strictures are dropped. So the expansive naturalist is a supernaturalist from the perspective of scientific naturalism, for he insists that we precisely do need something more than the world as comprehended by science. However, he would deny that this ‘more’ is to be located in a second, supernatural, realm, for his conception of nature exceeds the limits of scientific naturalism, granting him the right to say that it is this world – the familiar ordinary world – which is to be comprehended in these more expansive terms. As Griffin puts it, ‘the boundaries of the “natural” are pushed outward a bit, in a duly motivated way’.​[20]​
The natural world thus conceived incorporates value, an important focus of these naturalists being the moral values which come into play when beings like ourselves make moral distinctions and respond accordingly. It is granted that science has some role to play in explaining the relevant responses, the human sciences being of particular significance in this context.​[21]​ What is denied, however, is that it can cover all the explanatory ground – a concession which becomes rather less daunting once it is allowed that there is more to explanation and reality than what the scientist comprehends.  
Value is an essential part of the expansive naturalist’s picture, but he agrees with his scientistic opponent that the natural world must be shorn of any reference to gods and God, and we are encouraged to suppose that a move in either of these directions is both unnecessary and problematic. The charge is familiar, and in what follows I want to grant with the naturalist that we should be resisting unnecessary and problematic expansions, but deny that it follows from this that naturalism must be atheistic. In short, I shall argue that the expansive naturalist is operating with a deficient conception of God, namely, one according to which God is an unnecessary and problematic something else, that such items merit rejection, but that it does not follow from this that we must reject reference to God. As I shall spell out below, my argumentative strategy in this context involves following the structure of the expansive naturalist’s response to the charge that his own expanded conception of nature raises similar difficulties, my claim being that his objection to theistic naturalism invites an analogous response. To put it another way, I am suggesting that there is scope for allowing that nature is God-involving as well as being value-involving, that this move can be defended on (liberal) naturalistic grounds, and hence, that the expansive naturalist has every reason to take this option seriously.  

2. Naturalism and God
McDowell is too good a philosopher to insist upon the truth of atheism, and we find him using the imagery of darkness to refer to that which exceeds the limits of his more relaxed conception of nature – ‘the region of darkness’ as he describes it.​[22]​ It is here that we are returned to his own preferred conception of the meaning of ‘natural’, namely, ‘not supernatural (not occult, not magical)’, and he adds that:

[t]here is no need for me to take a stand on whether everything is natural in that sense (thereby, among other things, giving needless offence to people who think respect for modern science is compatible with a kind of religious belief that preserves room for the supernatural.​[23]​
	
	The imagery of darkness would suit the apophatic theologian, but McDowell is no such thing – intentionally at least – and seems to believe that this mysterious dimension, such as it is, could have no bearing upon nature and our natural human being. It is, after all, ‘occult’ and ‘magical’, and it calls to mind the ‘rampant platonism’ he criticises elsewhere, with its implication that our lives are ‘mysteriously split, somehow taking place both in nature and in some alien realm – in “Plato’s Heaven” perhaps’.​[24]​ 
McDowell’s criticisms of the supernatural are structurally equivalent to those of the scientific naturalist when he objects to the values which form part of the expansive naturalist’s ontology on the ground that they, too, are ‘occult’ and ‘magical’ (the word ‘spooky’ is the more usual term of abuse). Thus, we find Peter Railton, in the context of a dialogue with David Wiggins, bemoaning the ‘worrisome ontological expansion’ which ensues if we exceed his own preferred social-scientific terms, to which he adds that that we can explain everything that needs to be explained about value without making this problematic move – the relevant entities just produce unnecessary problems about what they could possibly be and how we could learn about them. ​[25]​ The refrain is getting familiar.
What does this have to do with God? Well, the expansive naturalist’s conception of ‘religious reality’ (to coin a phrase) turns it into something occult and alien – i.e. supernatural in the pejorative sense. But what if this conception can be challenged in the way that he challenges the scientific naturalist’s understanding of his own preferred conception of value? The expansive naturalist could try to block this parallel by objecting that the two cases are completely different – God is ‘occult’ and ‘alien’ in a way that value is not. Yet this response simply begs the question against the possibility of an alternative framework – one which challenges the assumption that God must be viewed in these pejorative terms and hence, that nature must exclude Him. 	
Does this not lead to a form of pantheism? After all, the naturalist is committed to a one-world position, and I seem to be suggesting that God can be accommodated within such a framework. The theist is no pantheist, but he denies that God sits alongside nature to create the unnecessary problems to which Griffin refers – as if it is a matter of adding an irrelevant and alien realm to the familiar natural world.​[26]​ Rather, it is this world which is God-involving, God being actively present in all things. So God is rescued from ‘some alien realm’, but He is not reducible to the world in which He is present, for He is its source and sustainer, and, as such, to be distinguished from anything within it, or indeed, beyond it.​[27]​ The theist will claim further that we can enter into loving fellowship with this actively present God, that our receptivity in this context brings personal transformation, and that this transformation is expressed most significantly at the level of morality. Indeed, we shall find Emmanuel Levinas claiming that being moral is the only way of relating authentically to God, anxious as he is to deflate the cognitive pretensions of those for whom God is a mere object of theory.​[28]​ 
Levinas offers a salutary reminder of our cognitive limitations in this context, and his example will be important when we consider what it could really mean to be a theistic naturalist. I am certainly not suggesting that there is an easy route to theism, nor that the difficulties it confronts are not genuine. My aim at this stage is simply to make clear that the typical naturalist’s conception of these difficulties can be challenged, and that once we move beyond the unduly restrictive parameters of scientism, there is scope for questioning the assumption that an expansion in the direction of God is bound to be philosophically disastrous If the expansive naturalist has shown us anything at all it is that the limits of nature are entirely unclear.

3. A worry and a response
The limits of nature may well be unclear, but there is a further reason for resisting the kind of move I am recommending, namely, that it goes against the prevalent assumption that naturalism and theism are logically incompatible. After all, it is standard in philosophy of religion today to define ‘naturalism’ in a way that excludes the existence of God or gods.​[29]​ It is standard also to suppose that naturalism is equivalent to scientific naturalism, and my response to this worry takes us back to what has been said already. The scientific naturalist does not have the monopoly on the meaning of this term, and recent philosophy testifies to its pliability. So its meaning is hardly fixed, and those who have embraced the term to their own particular ends have done so with an eye to the advantages it procures. In particular, it gives their philosophical endeavours the seal of empirical respectability. This meaning has not been stretched in a theistic direction – at least not by contemporary naturalists – and reservations on this score are therefore understandable.​[30]​ However, this does not rule out such a move, and if I am right then there are naturalistic arguments to this end – on a suitably expanded conception thereof. The virtues of this move should be apparent. For we are in a position to challenge the conclusion – common to most naturalists – that talk of God belongs to the realm of idle metaphysics, that it comprises an esoteric discipline which is irrelevant to what really matters, and that it has no bearing upon the question of nature and of our natural human being. 
A further notable advantage of my approach is that it offers the prospects for defending a theistic framework using philosophical resources which can genuinely appeal to an atheist – at least, one who has moved beyond the limits of scientistic naturalism. This point has been of particular significance to me. I have long been persuaded that there is nothing remotely pernicious or embarrassing about metaphysical enquiry per se, and that reference to Plato’s heaven or the Kingdom of God need not spell inevitable philosophical disaster. At the same time, however, I am aware of how problematic these notions can sound to contemporary philosophical ears. What better way to vindicate them than by reference to a metaphysical framework which demands no more than a resistance to scientism, a spirit of open-mindedness, and a preparedness to go where one’s arguments lead? I also find it ironic and amusing that the best philosophical defence of the position towards which I have been gradually moving should come from a way of thinking which, at one level at least, will have nothing to do with God. Of course, this refusal concedes nothing to the vitriolic tendencies of the militant atheist – understandably so given that the philosophers in question have no particular axe to grind, and have seen through the fundamentalist faith which tends to drive such attacks. Rather, and in true phenomenological spirit, they seek to return us to the things themselves, guarding against the imposition of frameworks which preclude the possibility of meeting such an aim. It is in the context of appreciating this methodological stance that we can begin to appreciate the theistic significance of their claims. Or so I contend.​[31]​  

4. Atheism, Theism, and Levinas
This is all very well, but I have said next to nothing about God, other than to make clear what He is not, and to claim that He is actively present in all things without being reducible to them. I have also made a point of mentioning Levinas’s worries about saying anything at all in this context, and his idea that we relate to God only at the level of morality. The idea that we relate to God only at this level must surely compromise the possibility of moving in the direction of theism. After all, the secular expansive naturalist operates at the level of morality, and his framework does not involve God. It remains open that the secular expansive naturalist is wrong about this, but if we add to the equation that God talk is excluded, then it is difficult to see how the relevant difference can be made out. It is surely a condition upon defending a theistic form of naturalism that it can be expressed.  
Levinas counts as a theist in the sense that he operates with a God-involving conception of reality, and he makes no bones about this dimension of his position. However, he is suspicious of the cognitive pretensions of theology, and anxious to distance himself from the invented gods of our wishful and egoistic thinking.​[32]​ He would object that these inventions make for the most pernicious form of atheism, pernicious in the sense that it is so easily mistaken for its opposite, offering easy canon fodder to those who see theism as a position for the intellectually challenged – witness the diatribes of Dawkins and his ilk. It is in the context of appreciating this point that we can see the significance of a kind of atheism which, for Levinas, has more profound theistic significance, namely, that which ‘void[s]…the child’s heaven’ so that we are no longer beholden to the offending idols. God is said to ‘retire[] from the world’ in this sense, and to ‘hide His face’. All the better to be revealed, we are to suppose, the revelation in question involving ‘a God who renounces all aids to manifestation, and appeals instead to the full maturity of the responsible man’. ​[33]​ It is Levinas’s contention that we relate to God – and know Him – by being moral, the implication being that this is the only such way: ‘[e]thics is not the corollary of the vision of God, it is that very vision. Ethics is an optic, such that everything I know of God and everything I can hear of His word and reasonably say to Him must find an ethical expression…to know God is to know what is to be done’.​[34]​ 
Levinas exposes the limitations of any position which treats God as just one more item within or beyond the world, applauding the removal of the familiar and offending other-worldly realms. So he agrees with the naturalist that we should be anti-supernaturalists in this sense, but he denies that this involves rejecting God, God being revealed in our moral interactions with others. As he sees it then, atheism is not invariably opposed to theism, and theism is most authentically expressed at the level of morality. 
If this is right, then the secular expansive naturalist is a closet theist, and the move I am recommending we make on his behalf has already been completed. It seems equally plausible, however, to protest that the theism at issue here is indiscernible from atheism, and that such a theism is unworthy of the name. This sceptical response is understandable, but it presupposes that the question of value is closed, that it has nothing to do with God, and that it is entirely clear in any case what it means to bring God to the equation. The themes with which we began – the nature and limits of nature and value – make it clear that all of these questions remain open, the central issue here being whether there is a conception of God which improves upon the crude supernaturalist model to which the typical naturalist is in thrall. It would therefore beg the very question at issue to insist that we know exactly what it means – or could not mean – to describe nature in God-involving terms.   
	But don’t we need to say something about God himself rather than simply focusing upon our moral responses? And wouldn’t this offer a more fruitful way of clarifying the distinction between atheism and theism? I have already acknowledged Levinas’s reservations about theology, whilst noting that he is happy to describe his position in God-involving terms. So there is a clear enough sense in which he is talking about God, and it is no part of his position that the God to which he refers is a mere idol (i.e. something less than God). Crucially, however, he believes that there are limits to what can be said if we are to avoid these lesser gods, and that whatever we do say in this context must be commensurate with the reality we are struggling to comprehend. Levinas is prepared to acknowledge that this reality is both infinite and moral, but he denies that it can be adequately appreciated in theoretical terms. Why? Because God cannot be reduced to an object of theory, and His irreducibly moral dimension must be reflected in our knowledge: to know God is to know what is to be done. Or as he puts it elsewhere, ‘[t]he infinite is not “in front of me”; it is I who express it’.​[35]​
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